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We  analyze  a group  contest  in  which  n groups  compete  to win  a group-speciﬁc  public
good  prize.  Group  sizes  can  be different  and  any  player  may  value  the  prize  differently
within  and  across  groups.  Players  exert  costly  efforts  simultaneously  and  independently.
Only  the highest  effort  (the  best-shot)  within  each  group  represents  the group  effort  that
determines  the winning  group.  We  fully  characterize  the  set of  equilibria  and  show  that
in  any  equilibrium  at most one  player  in  each  group  exerts  strictly  positive  effort.  There
always  exists  an  equilibrium  in  which  only  the  highest  value  player  in  each  active  group
exerts  strictly  positive  effort.  However,  perverse  equilibria  may  exist  in  which  the highest
value players  completely  free-ride  on others  by exerting  no effort.  We  provide  conditions
under  which  the  set  of  equilibria  can  be  restricted  and  discuss  contest  design  implications.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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f this setting include sports events between teams, rent-seeking contest between lobbying groups, electoral confrontation,
r war between coalitions.
Most studies on contests between groups use a perfect-substitutes group impact function in which the efforts of the group
embers within a group are perfectly substitutable and hence a group’s effort is determined by the sum of members’ efforts
n that group.1 However, Lee (2012) analyzes a group contest with the weakest-link group impact function where the efforts
f the members within a group are perfectly complementary and thus the minimum effort among the group members
epresents the group effort. Kolmar and Rommeswinkel (2013) further study group contests employing a constant elasticity
f substitution group impact function, which allows the impact function of a group to become a perfect-substitute type or a
eakest-link type with different degree of complementarity accordingly to the elasticity of substitution of efforts within
he group. In the current paper we study a group contest with a best-shot group impact function, where individual group
embers exert costly efforts simultaneously and independently, but only the highest effort within each group represents
he group effort.
Best-shot contests are readily observed in the ﬁeld. Among sporting events, the Fourball golf format in which a team
erformance is noted as the lowest score between the two  team members is a distinct example.2 In industrial organization,
he case of competing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) can be a close example of the aforementioned setup. If an RJV member
an make a high quality innovation then it beneﬁts the whole RJV, while other lower quality innovations by other members
f the same RJV get obsolete. Similar logic applies to the case of patent pools competing for industry standards (e.g. 4G
obiles), where the main patent (best-shot) provides most competing features of a particular patent pool. The best-shot
ublic good structure is also well documented and discussed in the defense economics and system reliability literature
Conybeare et al., 1994; Varian, 2004).3 The results show that in a defense or system reliability coalition, in the equilibrium
he group member with the highest valuation exerts strictly positive effort and the others free-ride by exerting no effort.
ur paper adds to this literature by introducing and characterizing the best-shot contest between groups. In contrast to
he aforementioned literature, we show that, in addition to the standard equilibrium where only ‘top guns’ ﬁre, multiple
quilibria in which top guns do not ﬁre may  arise.
A behavioral background for the best-shot impact function is given in Baik and Shogren (1998). Clark and Konrad (2007)
nd Deck and Sheremeta (2012) use a best-shot impact function as the attack mechanism in the context of terrorism. Topolyan
2011) applies the best-shot technology to portray extreme form of free-riding behavior in an all-pay auction between two
roups under symmetric valuations. Sheremeta (2011) uses the best-shot among other impact functions to experimentally
nvestigate group contests, without general theoretical analysis. However, none of the existing studies provide a thorough
nalysis of the best-shot group contests.
We characterize the complete set of equilibria for the best-shot group contest and show that in each equilibrium at most
ne player in each group exerts strictly positive effort, whereas all the other players in the group free-ride by exerting no
ffort. Unlike Baik (1993, 2008), who ﬁnds that in the perfect-substitutes contest only the highest-valuation member in
ach group exerts positive effort, in our best-shot contest the unique and active member in each group is not always the
ighest-valuation member in that group. Speciﬁcally, there are perverse equilibria in which a member whose valuation is
ot the highest within a group exerts strictly positive effort, while other members in that group, including the highest-
aluation member, free-ride by exerting no effort. These results are also different from the ones by Lee (2012), who shows
hat in equilibrium of the weakest-link contest there is no free-riding but there is a coordination problem due to the perfect
omplementarity of efforts among the group members. In contrast, in our best-shot contest there is severe free-riding in any
quilibrium. Interestingly, the free-riders in each group may  be the highest-valuation players as well as other low-valuation
layers.
We also rank the possible equilibria in our model and show the conditions under which perverse equilibria can be
voided from the perspective of a contest designer. Therefore, our paper is also related to the paper by Kolmar and Wagener
2012), who incorporate the contest mechanism into the public goods setting in order to solve two  efﬁciency failures: (1)
nsufﬁcient provision of public goods (quantity problem) and (2) unproductive players’ contributions to the public goods
sorting problem). They examine the optimal structures of the CSF (contest success function) and prizes that solve these two
roblems. Focusing on the sorting problem as in Kolmar and Wagener (2012), we specify the structure of players’ valuations
hat prevents perverse equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which the low-valuation players in each group exert positive efforts.
1 A function that translates the efforts of individual group members into the group effort is called a group impact function. The literature on group contest
riginated with the work of Katz et al. (1990). Katz et al. use symmetric players within each group, a perfect-substitutes group impact function (Bergstrom
t  al., 1986), and a lottery contest success function (Tullock, 1980). Most follow-up studies on group contests use the perfect-substitutes group impact
unction (Baik, 1993, 2008; Baik and Shogren, 1998; Baik et al., 2001; Münster, 2009). There is also a growing experimental literature examining contests
etween groups (Abbink et al., 2010; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Ahn et al., 2011; Sheremeta, 2011; Cason et al., 2012), for a review see Dechenaux et al.
2012).
2 Cycling team events like Tour de France have some aspects of best-shot contests. Although each member of a team participates separately in the contest,
f  any member of the team ﬁnishes ﬁrst, then it records the win  of the whole team. Team archery or shooting contests have similar features in which literally
he  best-shot among the team members determines the performance of the whole team.
3 Competing defense coalitions, such as the NATO and the Warsaw Pact, may follow the best-shot technology in which the best performance of the
oalition member determines the performance of the whole coalition (Conybeare et al., 1994). The same story holds for inland security coalition comprised
f  different independent bodies such as CIA and FBI, or in the context of system reliability (Varian, 2004).
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we  present and in Section 3 we  analyze our best-shot contest model. In Section
4, as an example, we consider a contest with three two-player groups. In Section 5, we  discuss contest design implications
and conclude by suggesting avenues for future research. Technical proofs are in the Appendix.
2. The model
Consider a contest in which n ≥ 2 groups compete to win  a group-speciﬁc public-good prize. Group g ∈ N, where N = {1,
2, . . .,  n} is a set of groups, consists of mg ≥ 2 risk-neutral players who exert costly efforts to win  the prize.
The individual group members’ valuation for the prize may  differ within group and across groups. This intra-group
asymmetry in values can be a result of player asymmetry, but it can also be interpreted as an exogenous sharing rule of
the group-speciﬁc prize, in which the prize-shares among the members of a group are different. Let vgi > 0 represent the
valuation for the prize of player i in group g. Without loss of generality, assume vg(t−1) ≥ vgt for mg ≥ t > 1, and v(k−1)1 ≥ vk1
for n ≥ k > 1. Let xgi ≥ 0, measured in the same unit as the prize values, represent the effort level exerted by player i in group
g.
Next, we specify the group impact function as fg : Rmg+ → R+, such that the group effort of group g is given by Xg =
fg(xg1, xg2, . . . , Xgmg ). The following assumption deﬁnes the best-shot technology:
Assumption 1. The group effort of group g is represented by the maximum effort level exerted by the players in group g,
i.e., Xg = max
{
xg1, xg2, . . . , xgmg
}
.
To specify the winning probability of group g, denote pg(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) : Rn+ → [0,  1] as a contest success function (Münster,
2009). Assumption 2 speciﬁes the regularity conditions for pg.
Assumption 2. pg(0, 0, . . .,  0) = 1/n,
∑n
g=1pg = 1, ∂pg/∂Xg ≥ 0, ∂2pg/∂X2g ≤ 0, ∂pg/∂Xk ≤ 0, ∂2pg/∂X2k ≥ 0 where k, g ∈ N and
k /= g. Furthermore, ∂pg/∂Xg > 0, ∂2pg/∂X2g < 0 for some Xk > 0, and ∂pg/∂Xk < 0, ∂2pg/∂X2k > 0 for Xg > 0.
We assume that all players forgo their efforts and they have a common cost function as described by Assumption 3.
Assumption 3. c : R+ → R+ is the common cost function of effort with the following properties: c(0) = 0, ∂c(xgi)/∂xgi > 0,
∂2c(xgi)/∂x2gi ≥ 0.
Only the members of the winning group receive the prize, while all other players receive nothing. Let gi represent the
payoff for player i in group g. Under the above assumptions, the payoff for player i in group g is
gi = vgipg(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) − c(xgi). (1)
Eq. (1) along with the three assumptions represents the best-shot group contest. To close the structure we  assume that all
players in the contest choose their effort levels independently and simultaneously, and that all of the above (including the
valuations, group compositions, impact functions, and the contest success function) is common knowledge.
We use the following deﬁnitions throughout the paper.
Deﬁnition 1. If player i in group g exerts strictly positive effort, i.e., xgi > 0, then the player is called active. Otherwise (when
xgi = 0) the player is called inactive.
Deﬁnition 2. If at least one player in group g exerts strictly positive effort, i.e., Xg > 0, then group g is called active. Otherwise
(when Xg = 0) the group is called inactive.
3. The equilibria of the game
We  employ Nash equilibrium as our solution concept and begin by stating Lemma  1. This lemma  points out that there
are always at least two groups that actively participate in a best-shot contest.
Lemma  1. In any equilibrium at least two groups are active.
Assumption 1 gives rise to Lemma  2.
Lemma  2. In an equilibrium only one player in each group, if any, is active.
Next, let xb
gi
∈ R+ denote the best-response of player i in group g in a situation where player i is a unique player in group
g. Lemma 3 follows.
Lemma  3. Given the effort levels of other groups,  xb
g(t−1) ≥ xbgt for mg ≥ t > 1.Lemmas 1 and 2 transform the game into a generalized version of an asymmetric value individual contest, whereas
Lemma  3 provides restrictions on the participation of the players. A combination of the three lemmas gives Corollary 1 that
we state without proof.
Corollary 1. An equilibrium in which player 1s in group 1 and 2 are active always exists.
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It follows from Lemma  3 that xbg1 > 0 for some g ≤ k ≤ n and xbg1 = 0 for g > k, i.e., given the distribution of values, there
an be instances in which the best response for every player in a group is to exert no effort, as each of their valuation is low
nough and exerting any positive effort will result in a negative payoff.
The general nature of the current setup restricts us from ﬁnding closed form solution for participation and equilibrium
ffort. To make the problem tractable and attain closed form solutions we  make the following restrictive assumptions. First,
ollowing the axiomatic foundation of Münster (2009) we  apply a logit (Tullock, 1980) form group contest success function.
econd, we use linear cost function with unit marginal cost.
ssumption 2′. The probability of winning the prize for group g is
pg(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Xg∑n
k=1Xk
if
n∑
k=1
Xk > 0
1
n
if
n∑
k=1
Xk = 0
.
ssumption 3′. The common cost function is c(xgi) = xgi.
Lemmas 1–3 under these two assumptions convert the best-shot group contest into a generalized asymmetric individual
ottery contest in which each group behaves like an individual contestant, but the valuation of the individual contestant may
hange depending on which group member within a group is active. We  use the results on asymmetric individual contest
y Stein (2002), who shows that in an n-player asymmetric contest some players may  not be active in an equilibrium. Using
roposition 1 of Stein (2002) we state the condition in Lemma  4 for active participation in the contest.
emma  4. Suppose each player Ej in group j = 1, 2, . . .,  k − 1(≤  n − 1) is already active. Then for at least one more player from
ny other group to be active, the following condition has to be satisﬁed:
vk1 >
(k − 2)˘j<kvjEj∑
j<k˘t /=  j,t<kvtEt
.
Lemma 4 gives us a set of sufﬁcient conditions to exclude one or more groups from participating in the best-shot contest.
his lemma  also gives Corollary 2 that shows the needed parametric restriction which, in turn, ensures participation of all
he groups in an equilibrium.
orollary 2. If vn1 > ((n − 2)˘j<nvj1)/
(∑
j<n˘t /=  j,t<nvt1
)
then, in an equilibrium, all n groups are active.
Based on Corollary 2, assume that ﬁrst n1 (<n)  groups are active in an equilibrium where each player Ej in group j = 1, 2,
 . .,  n1 is active, i.e.,
vn11 >
(n1 − 2)˘j<n1vjEj∑
j<n1
˘t /=  j,t<n1vtEt
and v(n1+1)1 <
((n1 + 1) − 2)˘j<(n1+1)vjmj∑
j<(n1+1)˘t /=  j,t<(n1+1)vtmt
.
rom Lemmas 1–4, one can expect that, under certain restrictions, there exists an equilibrium in which player 1 (the highest-
aluation player) in each active group exerts strictly positive effort and the other group members free-ride by exerting no
ffort, i.e., Ej = 1 for each active group j. In such a case, each highest-valuation active player exerts the equilibrium effort in an
1-player individual contest with asymmetric values as in Stein (2002). It is easy to verify that this constitutes an equilibrium
s no player, exerting strictly positive or zero effort, has an incentive to deviate from the effort level. This is summarized in
roposition 1.
roposition 1. Suppose
vn11 <
(n1 − 2)˘j<n1vj1∑
j<n1
˘t /=  j,t<n1vt1
and v(n1+1)1 <
((n1 + 1) − 2)˘j<(n1+1)vjmj∑
j<(n1+1)˘t /=  j,t<(n1+1)vtmt
,
.e., only ﬁrst n1 groups are active. Deﬁne
∗ n1 − 1
(
v−1g1
)xg1 = ∑n1
k=1v
−1
k1
1 − (n1 − 1)∑n1
k=1v
−1
k1
.
hen a proﬁle ((x∗11, 0, . . . , 0),  (x
∗
21, 0, . . . , 0),  . . . , (x
∗
n11
, 0, . . . , 0),  (0,  . . . , 0),  . . . , (0,  . . . , 0)) is a Nash equilibrium of the best-
hot group contest.
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The implication of Proposition 1 is that in the equilibrium only one of the players with the highest stake, or the most
efﬁcient player, exerts effort on behalf of the active group and all other group members free-ride by exerting no effort.4
This particular equilibrium indicates that in a market coalition such as an RJV or a defense coalition such as NATO, the
most efﬁcient player does not beneﬁt from being a member of the coalition, instead of contesting as an individual player.
Therefore, the equilibrium described by Proposition 1 does not justify the inclusion of the most efﬁcient player in a coalition
formation due to the exploitation of the great by the small (Olson, 1965), i.e., exploitation of the most efﬁcient players by other
members.5
Coalition formation may  be justiﬁed if there are perverse equilibria in which the most efﬁcient players can free-ride on
other players’ efforts. Or, in other words, in those equilibria the ‘top guns’ do not ﬁre and there is exploitation of the small by the
great. Proposition 2 shows that indeed perverse equilibria exist, justifying the existence of market, political and international
coalitions under best-shot technology.
Proposition 2. Suppose
vn11 >
(n1 − 2)˘j<n1vj1∑
j<n1
˘t /=  j,t<n1)vt1
and v(n1+1)1 <
((n1 + 1) − 2)˘j<(n1+1)vjmj∑
j<(n1+1)˘t /=  j,t<(n1+1)vtmt
.
Deﬁne
x∗gEg =
n1 − 1∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
(
1 − (n1 − 1)
v−1gEg∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
)
where Eg > 1 ∀ g ∈ N1 = {1, 2, . . .,  n1} . Then a proﬁle ((0, . . . , 0, x∗1E1 , 0, . . . , 0),  . . . , (0,  . . . , 0, x∗n1En1 , 0, . . . , 0),  . . . , (0,  . . . , 0)) is
a Nash equilibrium of the best-shot group contest if
vg1
vgEg
≤
⎛
⎝1 +
√√√√1 − (n1 − 1) v−1gEg∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
⎞
⎠∀g ∈ N1.
Proposition 2 fully characterizes the set of equilibria for the best-shot group contest. This proposition shows that it is
possible for a coalition to exist in which there is exploitation of the small by the great, and in which the most efﬁcient player
can earn a higher payoff as an inactive member of a group rather than contesting as an individual player. Nevertheless,
the ﬁnal payoff of each player, including the most efﬁcient players, crucially depends on the equilibrium selection and the
coordination between group members.
The rent dissipation results are very different in the current analysis compared to the group contests with other group
impact functions or the best-shot public good games. We  know that in the case of a perfect-substitutes impact function,
the total rent dissipation is uniquely determined (Baik, 1993) and a coalition-proof equilibrium is unique in the case of a
weakest-link impact function (Lee, 2012). It is not trivial to fully rank the equilibria in the best-shot case in terms of rent
dissipation. The following corollary points out the highest and the lowest possible rent dissipation in the best-shot group
contest.
Corollary 3. The highest (lowest) possible equilibrium rent is dissipated for a given number of active groups, when only the
highest (lowest) value players in each active group exert strictly positive effort. The rent dissipation is intermediate otherwise.
4. An example with three two-player groups
To portray a simple diagrammatic explanation of our general results we  consider an example with three two-player
groups, where there are three groups and each group consists of two  players. First, we show conditions for which one group
becomes inactive and the contest is reduced to a contest between two  two-player groups. Then we characterize the set of
equilibria for this reduced form contest.
As shown in Lemmas 1 and 2, in any equilibrium at least two groups will be active and only one player in each group will
be active. One can show that there can be 20 equilibria in which one player in each group is active and at least two  groups
are active. Now we impose condition v31 < (v12v22)/(v12 + v22). From Lemma  4, this means that both members of group 3
have relatively low valuations of the prize and active participation in the contest ensures loss to them. Hence, both players
in group 3 exert no effort and group 3 is always inactive. As a result the set of equilibria reduces to only 4. Let us denote the
equilibrium in which the player i from group 1 and the player j from group 2 are active as Nij. Then the four possible equilibria
4 This equilibrium is equivalent to the equilibrium in a group contest with perfect-substitutes impact function as in Baik (1993). The equilibrium strategies
are  also similar to the equilibrium strategies in best-shot public good games (Hirshleifer, 1983).
5 One may  argue, however, that the most efﬁcient player may  still be better off being a member of the coalition, instead of contesting as an individual
player, because it prevents the other members from exerting effort as potential opponents.
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Table 1
Equilibrium effort and corresponding condition (two active groups).
Equilibrium x11 x12 x21 x22 Equilibrium conditions
N11
v2
11
v21
(v11+v21)2
0
v11v
2
21
(v11+v21)2
0 No condition required
N12
v2
11
v22
(v11+v22)2
0 0
v11v
2
22
(v11+v22)2
˛2 ≤
(
1 +
√
v22
˛1v12+v22
)2
N21 0
v2
12
v21
(v12+v21)2
v12v
2
21
(v12+v21)2
0 ˛1 ≤
(
1 +
√
v12
v12+˛2v22
)2
N22 0
v2
12
v22
(v12+v22)2
0
v12v
2
22
(v12+v22)2
˛1 ≤
(
1 +
√
v12
v12+v22
)2
˛2 ≤
(
1 +
√
v22
v12+v22
)2
a
a
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bFig. 1. The equilibria.
re N11, N12, N21, and N22. Also, deﬁne ˛1 ≡ v11/v12(≥ 1) and ˛2 ≡ v21/v22(≥ 1). The necessary restrictions on parameters
nd the resulting equilibria are summarized in Table 1 and are shown diagrammatically in Fig. 1.
As stated in Corollary 3, the rent dissipation is highest for N11, lowest for N22 and intermediate for the other two equilibria.
his gives the ﬂexibility to a contest designer not only to select the equilibrium in terms of active players but also in terms
f rent dissipation. Depending on the distribution of values different equilibria may  exist, and thus the designer may  want
o impose certain restrictions to select a set of desirable equilibria. Fig. 2 summarizes the required equilibrium conditions
or N11, N12, N21, and N22 equilibria in ˛1 − ˛2 graph. Note that the equilibrium N11 always exists in which ‘top guns’ ﬁre.
owever, there are six segments of the graph where, in addition to N11, perverse equilibria exist in which ‘top guns’ do not
re.
. Discussion
In this paper we construct and analyze the best-shot group contest. We  ﬁnd that depending on the distribution of values
here can be multiple equilibria, but in each equilibrium only one player from each group exerts strictly positive effort.6 This
esult is robust to the number of groups, the number of players in each group, and the valuations of players. However, the
xact equilibrium strategies and rent dissipation are not uniquely determined and are not robust.
We identify the conditions on the distribution of values that can give rise to multiple equilibria. A contest designer may use
uch conditions to achieve a given objective. For example, if individual values portray the within-group prize sharing rules,
hen based on the fairness principle (Phillips, 1997) a designer can assign players to the groups such that most efﬁcient
layers always exert positive efforts. On the other hand, the objective of a designer can be to either achieve the highest
fﬁciency (Barr, 2004) or the lowest rent dissipation (Tullock, 1980). In any case, the appropriate distribution of values can
e selected to meet the objective.
6 Multiple equilibria have also been documented in simple two-player lottery contests with spillovers (Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011).
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In the context of public goods and defense economics literature (Hirshleifer, 1983, 1985; Bliss and Nalebuff, 1984; Harrison
and Hirshleifer, 1989; Cornes, 1993) it has been well recognized that using best-shot technology leads to equilibria in which
the most able players contribute to the public good. This result has been well known as the exploitation of the great by the
small (Olson, 1965), and it has been used to argue that it is difﬁcult to sustain market or defense coalitions because of the low
incentives (or none) for efﬁcient players to join the coalition. The current study shows that, there may  be scenarios where
there is exploitation of the small by the great, i.e., perverse equilibria in which ‘top guns’ do not ﬁre and the most efﬁcient
players free-ride on other players’ efforts. This result has important implications, as it justiﬁes coalition formation under the
best-shot structure.
The existence of multiple equilibria in the best-shot group contest also raises the issue of equilibrium selection (Galeotti
et al., 2010; Dall’Asta et al., 2011). As in the existing literature, if one models the issues of system reliability or defense
mechanisms in terms of best-shot public good game, then a unique equilibrium ensures no equilibrium selection concerns.
However, if one models the aforementioned situations in a more realistic contest setting, then the existence of multiple
equilibria will affect the comparative statics results. Hence, our ﬁndings reinforce the need for further research on equilibrium
selection in contests with best-shot impact functions. Even in the simplest case with two two-player groups presented in
Section 4, we show that depending on the distribution of the players’ valuations for the prize, the number of possible
equilibria ranges from one to four. Furthermore, if we  consider the possibility of mixed strategies (i.e., when active players
in the same group have the same valuations), or pre-contest coordination strategies, then the equilibrium selection becomes
even more complicated. Reﬁning the equilibria based on different equilibrium selection criteria is an interesting avenue for
the future research.
Appendix A.
Proof of Lemma  1. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which all the groups are inactive. In such a case, the payoff of
player i in group g is vgi/n. Now, suppose player i in group g exerts an inﬁnitesimal effort ε>0 instead of being inactive. Then
the payoff becomes vgi − c(ε) > vgi/n. Hence, all groups being inactive can never be an equilibrium. Now, suppose there exists
an equilibrium in which only group k is active. In such a case, from equation (1), the payoff of player i in group g is 0. Now
suppose player i in group g exerts an effort x∗
gi
> 0 instead of being inactive, where x∗
gi
is the best response of player i in
group g against Xk in the two-player individual contest with CSF deﬁned in Assumption 2. Consequently, the payoff becomes
pgvgi − x∗gi > 0. Thus, a single active group cannot constitute an equilibrium either. Hence in any equilibrium there are at
least two active groups.
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roof of Lemma  2. Suppose in an equilibrium more than one player, say players i and j, in group g exert strictly positive
fforts with xgi ≥ xgj > 0. Hence, the payoff of player j, under Assumption 1, is ′gj = vgjpg(X1, . . . , Xg−1, xgi, Xg+1, . . . , Xn) −
(xgj). In such a case it is always beneﬁcial for player j to reduce effort to zero and increase payoff to: x′′gj =
gjpg(X1, . . . , Xg−1, xgi, Xg+1, . . . , Xn) > ′gj . Hence, more than one player in the same group exerting strictly positive effort
annot be an equilibrium.
roof of Lemma  3. Suppose that player i in group g is a unique player in the group. Then the best-response of player i in
roup g is the non-negative effort level that maximizes its (non-negative) payoff, given the effort levels of the players in the
ther groups. Speciﬁcally, xb
gi
is the effort level that maximizes the payoff b
gi
= vgipg(X1, . . . , Xg−1, xgi, Xg+1, . . . , Xn) − c(xgi)
ubject to the non-negativity constraint xgi ≥ 0, and the participation constraint bgi(xbgi, x−g) ≥ 0, where X−g = (X1,. . .,Xg-1,
g+1,. . .,  Xn) Since the payoff function bgi is strictly concave, the solution x
b
gi
is unique, and satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
or maximizing b
gi
, c′(xgi)/(∂pg/∂xgi) ≥ vgi. The ﬁrst-order condition, jointly with Assumptions 2 and 3, ensure that xbgi is
onotonically increasing in vgi, given X−g. Finally, this observation along with the assumption vg(t − 1) ≥ vgt for mg ≥ t > 1
mplies that xb
g(t−1) ≥ xbgt for all X−g ≥ (0, . . . 0).
roof of Lemma  4. By assumptions vg(t − 1) ≥ vgt for mg ≥ t > 1 and v(k − 1)1 ≥ vk1 for n ≥ k > 1, when each player Ej in group
 = 1, 2, . . .,  k − 1 is already active. If player 1 of group k cannot earn positive payoff by exerting strictly positive effort, it is
mpossible for any other player El in group l = k, k + 1, . . .,  n to earn positive payoff by being active. Now, from Proposition 1 of
tein (2002) we know that when each player Ej in group j = 1, 2,. . .,k − 1 is active, then player 1 of group k will exert xk1 > 0
nd earn strictly positive payoff only if the condition vk1 >
(k−2)
∏
j<k
vjEj∑
j<k
∏
t  /=  j,t<kvjEt
is satisﬁed.
roof of Corollary 2. From Lemma 4, condition vn1 >
(n−2)
∏
j<n
vj1∑
j<n
∏
t /=  j,t<nvt1
ensures that at least player 1 in group n is always
ctive in an equilibrium even when player 1s in all the other groups are active. This, along with the assumption vg(t − 1) ≥ vgt
or mg ≥ t > 1, means that at least player 1 in group n is always active in an equilibrium when players other than player 1s from
ll the other groups are active. Also, if it is participation compatible for player 1 in group n, then assumption v(k − 1)1 ≥ vk1 for
 ≥ k > 1 and the properties of harmonic mean imply that it is participation compatible for player 1s in all the other groups.
roof of Proposition 1. Note that x∗g1 =
n1−1∑n1
k=1v
−1
k1
(
1 − (n1 − 1)
v−1
g1∑n1
k=1v
−1
k1
)
is the equilibrium effort of player
 in group g when the original contest is reduced to an n1-player contest which consists of the highest-
aluation players in groups 1, 2, . . .,  n1. From Lemma 4, the conditions vn11 >
(n1−2)
∏
j<n1
vj1∑
j<n1
∏
t  /=  j,t<n1
vt1
and v(n1+1)1 <
((n1+1)−2)
∏
j<(n1+1)
vjmj∑
j<(n1+1)
∏
t /=  j,t<(n1+1)
vtmt
restrict only the ﬁrst n1 groups to be active in an equilibrium. Hence, the following proﬁle
(x∗11, 0, . . . , 0),  (x
∗
21, 0, . . . , 0),  . . . , (x
∗
n1, 0, . . . , 0),  (0,  . . . , 0),  . . . , (0,  . . . , 0)
)
is an equilibrium.
roof of Proposition 2. Note that x∗gEg =
n1−1∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
(
1 − (n1 − 1)
v−1
gEg∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
)
is the equilibrium effort of player Eg > 1 in
roup g when the original contest is reduced to the n1-player contest consisting of the Egth highest-valuation players in each
roup g ∈ N1. Hence, in a proﬁle
(
(0,  . . . , 0, x∗1E1 , 0, · · ·,  0),  . . . , (0,  · · ·,  0, x
∗
n1En1
, 0, · · ·,  0),  . . . , (0,  . . . , 0)
)
player Eg in group
 exerts strictly positive reduced-form-individual-contest effort and the others in the group exert no effort. For this proﬁle
o be a Nash equilibrium, no player in the contest should have an incentive to deviate from this proﬁle. It is straightforward
o show that any player i = Eg + 1, Eg + 2, . . .,  mg in group g does not have an incentive to deviate according to Lemma 3.
Similarly, it is straightforward to show that player 1 in group g has the highest incentive, if any, to deviate from this
roﬁle because xbg1(X−g) ≥ xbg2(X−g) ≥ · · · ≥ xbgEg (X−g). This means that if player 1 in group g does not have an incentive to
eviate from this proﬁle, then players 2, 3, . . .,  (Eg − 1) in group g do not have such incentives, either. Therefore, in order to
etermine if this proﬁle is an equilibrium, it is enough to check if player 1 in each group g has any incentive to deviate from
t.
Now we show the conditions under which player 1 in group g does not deviate from the proﬁle
(0,  · · ·, 0, x∗1E1 , 0, · · ·,  0),  . . . , (0,  · · ·,  0, x
∗
n1En1
, 0, · · ·,  0),  . . . , (0,  . . . , 0)
)
. Under this proﬁle, player 1 in group g exerts no
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effort, and the winning probability of group g is pg =
(
1 − (n1 − 1)
v−1
gEg∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
)
. Hence, the payoff of player 1 in group g is
g1 = vg1
(
1 − (n1 − 1)
v−1
gEg∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
)
.
If player 1 in group g deviates from the proﬁle, his optimal effort level is xbg1(X−g) =
√
vg1
∑n1
k /= gXk −
∑n1
k /= gXk =√
vg1
∑n1
k /=  gx
∗
kEk
−∑n1k /=  gx∗kEk = n1−1∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
(√
vg1
vgEg
− (n1 − 1)
v−1
gEg∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
)
. However, by deviating from the proﬁle, this
player earns the payoff dg1 = vg1
(√
vg1
vgEg
− (n1 − 1)
v−1
gEg∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
)(√
vgEg
vg1
− (n1 − 1)
v−1
g1∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
)
. Then, for player 1 in group
g not to deviate from the proﬁle, we need g1 ≥ dg1, i.e., g1 − dg1 = −
n1−1∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
(
vg1
vgEg
− 2
√
vg1
vgEg
+ (n1 − 1)
v−1
gEg∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
)
≥
0. The inequality can be rewritten as g1 − dg1 = −
n1−1∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
×
(√
vg1
vgEg
− 1 −
√
1 − (n1 − 1)
v−1
gEg∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
)
×(√
vg1
vgEg
− 1 +
√
1 − (n1 − 1)
v−1
gEg∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
)
≤ 0.
Therefore, the following proﬁle
(
(0,  · · ·,  0, x∗1E1 , 0, · · ·,  0),  . . . , (0,  · · ·, 0, x
∗
n1En1
, 0, · · ·,  0),  . . . , (0,  · · ·,  0)
)
is a Nash equilib-
rium if ∀g ∈ N1, vg1vgEg ≤
(
1 +
√
1 − (n1 − 1)
v−1
gEg∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
)
.
Proof of Corollary 3. Suppose n1 groups are active. From Proposition 2, the total equilibrium rent dissipation is∑n1
g=1x
∗
gEg
=∑n1g=1
⎛
⎝ n1−1∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
−
[
n1−1∑n1
k=1v
−1
kEk
]2
(v−1gEg )
⎞
⎠ = (n1 − 1) ∏n1k=1vkEk∑n1
l=1
∏n1
k /=  lvkEk
. Differentiating with respect to the value
of an active player t we get
∂
∑n
g=1x
∗
gEg
∂vtEt
= (n1−1)(∑n1
l=1
∏n1
k /=  lvkEk
)2 [(∑n1l=1∏n1k /=  lvkEk)∏n1k /=  tvkEk − (∏n1k=1vkEk)∑n1l=1∏n1k /=  l,tvkEk] =
(n1−1)
∏n1
k  /=  tvkEk(∑n1
l=1
∏n1
k /=  lvkEk
)2 [(∑n1l=1∏n1k /=  lvkEk)− vtEt∑n1l=1∏n1k /=  l,tvkEk] = (n1−1)
(∏n1
k /=  tvkEk
)2(∑n1
l=1
∏n1
k  /=  lvkEk
)2 > 0, i.e., the total rent dissipation is
monotonically increasing in the values of the active players. Hence, the equilibrium in which only the highest valuation
player in each group exerts positive effort results in the highest rent dissipation among the set of equilibria of the best-shot
group contest. Following the same logic, the equilibrium in which only the lowest valuation player in each group exerts
positive effort, dissipates the lowest rent and the intermediate cases will result in intermediate rent dissipation and the
ranking will depend on the distribution of values within and between groups.
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